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CURRENT DECISIONS
Federal Taxation-AccuMULATED EARNINGS TAx-THE QUANTUM
OF TAx AVOIDANC PURPOSE REQUIRED. United States v. Donruss Co., 89
S. Ct. 501 (1969).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed and the respondent
corporation paid accumulated earnings taxes for the years 1960 and
1961.1 In a refund suit, the jury found that Donruss had accumulated
earnings beyond the reasonable needs of its business, but not for the
purpose of avoiding income tax for its sole stockholder;2 accordingly,
the district court held for respondent corporation.3 The Government
requested, but the court refused to give the following instruction:
[I]t is not necessary that avoidance of shareholder's tax be
the sole purpose for the unreasonable accumulation of earnings; it
is sufficient if it is one of the purposes for the company's accumula-
tion policy.4
Instead, the court instructed the jury in terms of the statute-that the
corporation must have been "... availed of for the purpose of avoiding
the income tax .... )) 5
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,
holding that "... the jury might well have been led to believe that tax
avoidance must be the sole purpose behind an accumulation in order to
impose the accumulated earnings tax . . ." and that it was prejudicial
error not to clarify the statutory language.0 The court stated that the
jury should have been instructed that the tax avoidance purpose had
to be the dominant, controlling, or impelling motive for the accumu-
1. 89 S. Ct. 501 (1969).
2. The corporation had profitable operations, increasing its undistributed earnings
from $1,021,288.58 to $1,679,315.37, from 1955 through 1961. Wiener, the sole stock-
holder, cited inventory requirements, increasing costs, business risks, and a general
desire to expand as reasons for the accumulation policy. More specifically, he asserted
his desire to invest in respondents major distributor, the Tom Huston Peanut
Company. Respondent had no definite plans with regard to this investment during
the tax years in question, but did purchase stock in Tom Huston at a cost of $380,000
in 1964. Id. at 502.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 89 S. Ct.
501 (1969).
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lation.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
among the circuits, and held that tax avoidance need be only one pur-
pose for accumulation in order for the accumulated earnings tax to be
exacted.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 imposes an accumulated earnings
tax of significant proportions on
... every corporation... formed or availed of for the purpose of
avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders or the
shareholders of any other corporation, by permitting earnings and
profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed.0
The taxpayer usually has the burden of disproving such a purpose be-
cause of the statutory presumption in the Government's favor.'0 The
narrow issue presented in Donruss concerned the quantum of purpose
which the taxpayer had to show to defeat the imposition of the accumu-
lated earnings tax."
Although courts have used various words to describe the quantum
of purpose required (e.g., sole, dominant, determining, aiding), the real
issue has been whether only "a" purpose of tax avoidance sufficed or
whether a greater degree of tax avoidance purpose was required in order
for the accumulated earnings tax to be imposed on the accumulation.
7. Id., 384 F.2d at 297-98.
8. rINT. Rv. CoDE of 1954, S 531.9. Id. S 532 (a).
10. Section 533 provides for a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government
whenever the earnings and profits have been permitted to accumulate beyond the "rea-
sonable needs" of the company. As Judge Learned Hand said:
"[A] statute which stands on the footing of the participants' [sic] state
of mind may need the support of presumption, indeed be practically un-
enforceable without it, but the test remains the state of mind itself, and
the presumption does no more than make the taxpayer show his hand.
United Business Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 754, 755
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 635 (1933).
Since section 535(c) provides for a computation credit in an amount equal to the
earnings and profits retained for the "reasonable needs" of the business, almost all
cases involve an "unreasonable" accumulation and the presumption is made against
the taxpayer. Prior to the enactment of that section in 1954, some cases did arise in
which the accumulations were not unreasonable, but the taxpayer still usually had
to prove absence of tax avoidance purpose. Section 534 provides for shifting the
burden of proof (but possibly not the burden of proof of purpose) to the Government
in certain very limited situations. See generally, e.g., Pye, Section 534 and the Shift-
less Burden of Proof, 51 A.B.A.J. 784 (1965); Comment, Accumulated Earnings Tax:
Burdens of Proof of Reasonableness and Purpose, 54 CAL.. L. Rav. 1050 (1966).
11. This is to be distinguished from the quantum of proof necessary to show pur-
pose or reasonableness of accumulation.
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Decisions in the second,12 fourth, 3 and fifth 4 circuits required that
tax avoidance be only "one" purpose or "a" purpose of retaining earnings
and profits. The second circuit in a 194315 decision, Trico Products
Corp. v. Commissioner,' relied on a Supreme Court decision 7 in stating
that the tax avoidance purpose must have "aided in inducing" the ac-
cumulation. While emphasis on the Supreme Court decision might
have been misplaced, 8 the result appears to be in accord with the fourth
and fifth circuit opinions, 19 which asserted that this interpretation was
the best way to implement the congressional attempt to deter use of the
corporate entity as an "umbrella" to avoid personal income taxes. One
court stated further that:
The utility of the badly needed presumption arising from the
accumulation of earnings or profits beyond the reasonable needs of
the business is well nigh destroyed if that presumption in turn is
saddled with requirement of proof of "the primary or dominant
purpose" of the accumulation.20
The eighth2' and tenth22 circuits purportedly occupied an inter-
mediate ground, requiring that tax avoidance be "one of the determin-
ing" purposes. However, since almost any true purpose will have a
12. Trico Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 424, 426 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 799 (1943). See also United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 337 F.2d 280,
282 (2d Cit. 1964).
13. Semagraph Co. v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 62 (4th Cit. 1945)
14. Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 817 (1962).
15. While the holdings discussed here date from the early 1940's, the accumulated
earnings tax itself dates back to 1913, when the tax was imposed directly on the
shareholders. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II-A(2), 38 Star. 114, 166. In 1921, the law
was changed to provide for assessment against the corporation. Revenue Act of 1921,
ch. 136, § 220, 42 Star. 227, 247.
16. 137 F.2d 424, 426 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 779 (1943).
17. Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 693, 699 (1943).
18. The Supreme Court while actually discussing another issue said, "[Whatever
the motive when the practice of accumulation was adopted, the purpose of avoiding
surtax induced, or aided in inducing, the continuance of the practice." [Emphasis
added.] Id. The court, in Trico, admitted the facts were different. 137 F.2d at 426.
in Trico, admitted the facts were different. 137 F.2d at 426.
19. The opinion stated that tax avoidance need not be the dominant purpose. 137
F.2d at 426.
20. Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 817 (1962).
21. Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121, 123 (8th Cit. 1958).
22. World Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186, 189-90 (10th Cit. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911 (1949).
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determining effect, little difference can be seen between "a" purpose
and "one of the determining" purposes2
In recent cases, the first2 4 and sixth 25 circuits have held that tax
avoidance had to be the "primary, dominant or impelling" motive behind
an accumulation. In Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner,26 the court
stated that an individual having mere knowledge of possible tax savings
could hardly assert that tax savings was not "a" purpose under the
other tests." The court stated:
If knowledge of such a result is to be the test of purpose, then the
only corporations that could safely accumulate income would be
those having stockholders with substantial net losses.28
In short, these two jurisdictions took a view much more favorable to the
taxpayer.29
No courts have held that tax avoidance must be the sole motive for
accumulation before the tax would apply.30
The Supreme Court in United States v. Donruss Co.31 reversed the
23. Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121, 123 (8th Cir. 1958), even
cites the Trico decision in support of its conclusion. The following illustrates the
close semantic distinction by contrast: if these courts had said "the determining"
purpose, then the test would have been nearly indistinguishable from the "dominant
or controlling" purpose test (discussed infra). See E-Z Sew Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States, 260 F. Supp. 100 (E.D. Mich. 1966); Fenco, Inc. v. United States, 234 F. Supp.
317 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd per cuiamn, 348 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1965).
24. Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488, 491-92 (1st Ci. 1960). See
also Appollo Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 867, 876 (1st Cir. 1966).
25. Shaw-Walker Co. v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 205, 216 (6th Cir. 1968); Donruss
Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 296-98 (6th Cir. 1967).
26. 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960).
27. Tax savings alone is evidence of a purpose to avoid taxes. The jury could
logically infer that one intended obvious and natural consequences. See 7 MERTENS
LAw OF FEDPRAL INcOME TAXATION (1967 rev.) § 39.26 at 45-46.
28. 281 F.2d at 491. The well-reasoned opinion goes on to say: "The issue is not
what are the necessary, and to that extent contemplated consequences of the accumu-
lation, but what was the primary or dominant purpose which led to the decision." Id.
29. This view is possibly more in accord with antitrust laws in that it enables
individuals to incorporate more freely, and compete with larger corporations. Other-
wise, individuals may be discouraged from incorporating and, instead, join with larger
corporations. See Ziegler, The "New" Accwnulated Earnings Tax: A Survey of
Recent Developments, 22 TAx L. REv. 77, 120-21 (1966).
30. E.g., Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1967); Kerr-
Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121, 122-23 (8th Cir. 1958); World Publishing
Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186, 189-90 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911
(1949).
31. 89 St. Ct. 501 (1969).
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decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,3 2 and held that
avoidance of shareholder tax need be only "one" purpose of accumula-
tion for the accumulated earnings tax to apply.3 Because the statutory
language was unclear, the Court turned to the congressional intent.3 4 It
intimated that any other test would be inconsistent with that intentas and
would unduly weaken the presumption of a purpose of avoidance., The
Court stated, "[O]ur holding would [not] make purpose totally irrele-
vant. It still serves to isolate those cases in which tax avoidance motives
did not contribute to the decision to accumulate." .37
On the basis of this decision the accumulated earnings tax, if other-
wise applicable, will be assessed against a corporate taxpayer which
accumulates earnings with "a" purpose of avoiding personal income taxes
regardless of other purposes or motives. As the dissent in Donruss sug-
gests,"' if the jury does not carefully weigh subtleties, then accumula-
tion of earnings together with mere knowledge of the tax savings may
satisfy the "one" purpose quantum requirement of the Supreme Court.
The taxpayer must disprove any tax avoidance purpose.
ROBERT S. PARKER, JR.
Armed Services-THE RIGHT TO PRE-INDUCTION JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Oestereicb v. Selective Service System, 89 S. Ct. 414 (1968).
A divinity student, unconditionally entitled to exemption from mili-
tary service by statute,1 was reclassified as delinquent,2 and subsequently
32. 384 F.2d 292 (6th Cit. 1967)
33. 89 S. Ct. at 504. The Court recognized Young as a strong case in the taxpayer's
favor, but rejected it.
34. Id. at 504-07.
35. Id. at 505.
36. Id. at 507.
37. Id. at 508.
38. Id. at 508-10.
1. Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(g), 62 Stat. 611
(now Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. App., § 456(g) (1967)). This
provision grants students enrolled in a theological school an exemption from training
and service.
2. Plaintiff returned his registration certificate to the Government in expressing
his dissent from United States participation in the Vietnam war. Every person must
have his registration certificate in his possession at all times. 32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1968).
The local Selective Service board has the authority to declare a registrant to be
delinquent whenever he fails to perform any duty required of him, apart from
the duty to obey an order to report for induction. 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4(a) (1968).
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